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Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi and Chanda Chungu
Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited v ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc and Konkola
Copper Mines Plc, CAZ/08/249/2019
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi 1 and Chanda Chungu 2
Facts
In November 2004, the Government of the Republic of Zambia had concluded an agreement
in which Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited (“Vedanta”), acquired a majority shareholding
interest in Konkola Copper Mines (“KCM”). Following this acquisition, ZCCM Investment
Holdings Plc (“ZCCM-IH”) negotiated and executed a Shareholders Agreement and Articles
of Association. Among other things, the aforementioned agreements provided that Vedanta
would be responsible for appointing the Chief Executive Officer, who in turn was responsible
for appointing a Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and other senior
management.

On 21st May 2019, the ZCCM-IH commenced winding up proceedings by way of a petition in
the High Court of the Republic of Zambia with the view to wind up KCM based on the
allegation that the mine was being mismanaged by Vedanta, contrary to the provisions of the
Shareholders Agreement that was executed between the Appellants and the Respondents. In
the petition filed by ZCCM-IH it was alleged that Vedanta had managed KCM in a manner that
was detrimental to the interests of ZCCM-IH. Among other things it was alleged that:
•

Vedanta had only declared dividends five times in the fifteen years amounting to a total
of USD 67.105 Million. Furthermore, Vedanta had failed to pay ZCCM-H the sum of
USD 10,305,000.00 which was the latter’s share of the dividend, despite the fact that
it was declared in 2013;

•

Vedanta had operated at a loss for the preceding seven years. Cumulatively these losses
amounted to USD 1.2623 billion;

•

Vedanta was not able to meet its operating costs between 2013 and 2019;

•

The company was failing to pay its debts. For example, it owed Copperbelt Energy
Corporation Plc the sum of USD 24,064,722 and Ndola Lime sums of USD 468,036.25
and ZMW 199,941;

•

Vedanta had been operating in a manner that was not environmentally friendly or
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sustainable. They had polluted and continued to pollute water sources in and around
the mining licence areas. Consequently, they were found liable for polluting the Kafue
River by the Supreme Court of Zambia under Appeal No. 1 of 2012;
•

They had provided a mining plan pursuant to section 35(1)(b) of the Mines and
Minerals Development Act, 2015 and failed to abide by it. For example, they had failed
to develop the mining areas in Chingola and Chililabombwe and to carry out mining
operations with due diligence. This meant that they continued to operate below
capacity. Failure to adhere to the requirements of the Mines and Minerals Development
Act, meant that the Ministry of Mines issued a default notice against Vedanta.

•

That at the same time that the winding up proceedings where commenced, the ZCCMIH obtained an ex-parte order appointing a Provisional Liquidator over Konkola
Copper Mines and the order of appointment gave the Provisional Liquidator very wide
powers over and above the requirement to preserve the assets of the company.

Vedanta applied for a stay of execution in these liquidation proceedings because the
Shareholders Agreement between the Government of Zambia and Vedanta, contained an
arbitration clause. 3 Under this arbitration clause, all disputes arising out of the Shareholders
Agreement were to be settled by arbitration. The term ‘dispute’ was defined quite broadly in
the Shareholders Agreement.4 Vedanta contended that since ZCCM-IH felt that KCM was
being managed in a manner that was detrimental, there was a dispute between the parties as per
the Shareholders Agreement, and therefore it should be referred to arbitration. 5

Counsel for Vedanta contended that since there was an arbitration clause, the Court was
compelled to stay the liquidation proceedings and accordingly refer the matter to arbitration,
by virtue of section 10 of the Arbitration Act of 2000.6 This is because section 10 of the
Arbitration Act was couched in mandatory terms. The aforementioned provision says that:

(1) A court before which legal proceedings are brought in a matter which is the
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests at any stage of the
proceedings and notwithstanding any written law, stay those proceedings and refer
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the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
(2) Where proceedings referred to in subsection (1) have been brought, arbitral
proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be
made, while the issue is pending before the court.

In advancing their argument, Counsel for Vedanta argued relied on the case of Konkola Copper
Mines v NFC Africa Mining (2006), under which the Supreme Court held that where there is
an arbitration clause and a party applies for a stay of proceedings under section 10 of the
Arbitration Act, the Court has no choice but to refer a matter to arbitration. The only exception
to this rule, is if the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
performance.

The High Court disagreed. In their view this was not a proper case to refer the parties to
arbitration. As far as the High Court was concerned, the arbitration agreement was “null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. The court acknowledged that section 10
was couched in mandatory terms. 7 However, it noted that this same section also provided that
the Court should refuse to stay proceedings in the event that it finds that the arbitration clause
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 8

The High Court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the liquidation proceedings.
The ultimate aim of such proceedings was to protect third parties. 9 Included in the category of
third parties are the creditors of a company which is to be wound up. The High Court noted
that creditors had already filed their Notices of Intention to be heard in the winding-up petition.
Thus, despite the fact that there was a dispute between the parties to the Shareholders
Agreement, the Court had a duty to consider the interests of third parties, in the matter before
it.

The High Court opined that where third party rights were involved in liquidation proceedings,
“the private agreement between shareholders and a company to submit their dispute to
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arbitration is displaced and rendered inoperative.” 10 This is owing to the fact that the other
competing interests are completely separate from the interests of the parties to the arbitration
process. The former thus supersedes the latter because it can only be taken care of through the
court process. 11
In addition to this, the Court was of the view that the arbitration agreement itself did not apply
to the creditors, whose Notice of Intention to be heard was already before the court. 12 Given
this fact, the arbitration agreement was inapplicable. As such, the High Court dismissed the
application to stay the liquidation proceedings. 13

Grounds for Appeal
Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, Vedanta launched an appeal before the Court
of Appeal. Among other things, Vedanta contended that after finding that there was in fact an
arbitrable dispute between the parties, the learned High Court judge should have referred the
matter to arbitration, pursuant to section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act. 14 Furthermore, Vedanta
contended that the learned judge erred in finding that the arbitration clause was inoperable.

Holding
The Court of Appeal held that Vedanta had substantially succeeded in its appeal against the
High Court’s refusal to stay proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. 15 This was owing
to the fact that inter alia that there was indeed a dispute between the parties as defined in the
Shareholders Agreement. In addition to this, the Court of Appeal held that Vedanta possessed
the requisite locus standi to apply for a stay of the winding up petition and refer the matter to
arbitration. Moreover, the Court of Appeal opined that the disputes between the parties were
referable to arbitration. As such, the arbitration agreement between the parties was indeed
arbitrable. 16

The Court of Appeal opined that there was indeed a dispute between the parties. The Court
first looked at the meaning of ‘dispute’ under the Shareholders Agreement, which defined it as
meaning, “any dispute, disagreement, controversy, claim or difference of whatsoever nature
10
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arising under, out of, in connection with or relating (in any manner whatsoever) to this
Agreement or the interpretation or performance of this Agreement or the breach, termination
or validity thereof.” 17 Moreover, under Clause 26.1 of the Shareholders Agreement, the parties
consented to submit “any dispute” to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal opined that according to Clause 3 of the Shareholders Agreement, the
primary object of the company was to conduct business and carry it out in accordance with
scheduled programmes. 18 The main business of KCM was mining. The fact that ZCCM-IH had
taken issue with the manner in which mining operations were being conducted meant that there
was a dispute which fell “clearly within the ambit of arbitration as agreed”. 19

The Court contended that the matter should be referred to arbitration because the dispute
concerned here arises from the performance of obligations imposed on KCM and Vedanta
under the Shareholders Agreement. The Court of Appeal contended that the case of Ody’s Oil
Company, 20 on which the High Court based its decision, was distinguishable and opined that:

In that case the court refused to refer the matter to arbitration because the contractual agreement
was tainted with illegality. In addition to this, another party which was a stranger to the arbitration
agreement was involved. The court was of the view that referring part of the case to arbitration
would lead to multiplicity of actions, which could result in conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeal opined that that was not the case here. The grievances arose from the
Shareholders Agreement and was a dispute among the shareholders. As such, the interests of
third party creditors did not arise, because third party creditors were not precluded from
approaching the court in their own right. As such, the Court of Appeal found that the arbitration
agreement was operative and capable of performance between the parties to the Shareholders
Agreement. 21 The Court of Appeal thus set aside the decision of the High Court, ordered a stay
of the winding up proceedings and referred the matter to arbitration as requested by Vedanta.

Significance
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As a general rule, the arbitration clause forms the basis of the arbitration. By entering into an
agreement to arbitrate, the parties essentially commit to submit certain disputes which may
arise to arbitration, rather than the Courts. As such, the parties grant jurisdictional powers to
private individuals (the arbitrators) to determine their dispute and issue an arbitral award
thereafter. This fact is underscored in section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act, No. 19 of 2000
which says:

A court before which legal proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration
agreement shall, if a party so requests at any stage of the proceedings and notwithstanding any
written law, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

Therefore, as a general rule, the courts must refer a matter to arbitration, where there is an
arbitration clause, provided one of the parties requests the matter be referred to arbitration. The
Court of Appeal in the earlier case of Beza Consulting Inc. Limited v Bari Zambia Limited and
Gidey Genremariam Egziabher, 22 gave guidance when they stated that:

What section 10 [of the Arbitration Act] does, however, is to require the ouster of the
Court’s jurisdiction to be triggered by a request by a party to the arbitration agreement,
which party must also be a party to the proceedings.

Based on the foregoing Court of Appeal authority, which was confirmed in the Vedanta
judgment, before the Court can consider referring the matter to arbitration, all the parties to the
proceedings before it must also be parties to the arbitration agreement, and at least one of them
must refer it to arbitration. Indeed, in both Beza Consulting and the Vedanta case, the Court of
Appeal confirmed that the only exception to this rule that the matter must be referred to
arbitration is where the court finds that the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed. According to the Court of Appeal, third party interests do not
fall within the stipulated exceptions.

The Court of Appeal’s decision to quash that of the High Court is a welcome one. Investors
elect to have disputes settled through arbitration for a plethora of reasons. The first is that it is
relatively quicker than litigation through the national courts. Litigation disputes can take

22
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several years to bring to finality. Arbitration on the other hand, can take only a matter of
months. There is also greater confidentiality during the arbitral proceedings. Moreover,
investors are more confident of having their dispute heard in a neutral forum, because arbitral
proceedings take place above the fray of the justice system of the host State. This decision
ensures that where there is a dispute, the investor can still have their dispute heard expeditiously
and in a neutral forum, without the other party using the courts as a delaying tactic. Holding
otherwise would have set a bad precedent for the area of International Commercial Arbitration
in Zambia.

This decision by the Court of Appeal is also welcome, as it shows that the courts are an effective
buffer against the resource nationalism cycle. The advanced stages of the resource nationalism
cycle invariably manifest, when the State seeks to exercise greater control over natural resource
development and to limit the operations of the investor.23 This is typically sparked by an
increase in the prices of natural resources on the international market. In such instances, the
State wishes to gain more revenue from its natural resource, either by reversing any tax breaks
the investor has previously enjoyed, or outrightly nationalizing their assets. 24

Whether or not a resource rich nation succeeds in that endeavour, depends largely on its
institutions and the checks and balances that exist. Where institutions are weak, it is easier for
the host State to pursue a resource nationalist agenda. 25 Where institutions are strong and
independent, it is a lot harder for the host State to do so. This decision of the Court of Appeal
demonstrates that there exist institutional constraints in the form of checks and balances. As
such, the Zambian judiciary has demonstrated that it can be a highly effective buffer against
the resource nationalism cycle in Zambia.
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